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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of institutional directors on the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(CSRD) in the Jordanian banks. A comprehensive CSR checklist, consisting of 100 items, is designed to collect 
the data from 147 observations from 2004 to 2013. The descriptive analysis shows, relatively, a low level of 
CSRD with a mean of 46%. In addition, institutional directors occupy 46.4% of the banks’ board seats. The 
analysis shows that 11% of the institutional directors are serving as CEOs, 22.5% are independent institutional 
directors and 65.5% are non-independent non-executive directors. Results from multiple regression analysis 
show that institutional directors, has a negative and non-significant impact on the level of CSRD. However, we 
break down the institutional directors to two groups based on their status; institutional independent directors and 
institutional non-independent non-executive directors. The results show that the two groups have positive 
significant impacts on the level of CSRD. Then, the institutional CEO (CEO institutional-affiliated) is analyzed 
and it has a significant negative impact. Regarding the control variables, bank age and leverage significantly and 
positively enhance the CSRD while board size and profitability (ROA) are insignificantly related to CSRD. 
 
Keywords: CSRD, Institutional directors, banks, Jordan. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, the interest of CSRD has increased among academics and practitioners in the economic 
world. Major companies have started concerning to promote awareness about social and environmental impacts. 
After the collapse of big corporations in the world such as Commerce Bank (1991), Adelphia, Enron 2001, and 
World Com 2002, the demand of more financial and non-financial information has steadily increased. Those big 
financial scandals revealed the lack of ethical, social and environmental corporate concerns. 
 
In the case of Jordan, the collapse of Al-Batra Bank in 1989 has knocked the alarm of the need to improve the 
banking system. The bank was established in Jordan in 1978 and became the second largest bank in the country 
but it collapsed in 1989. The bank’s bankruptcy had many dark sides on the Jordanian economy as a whole not 
only on the Jordanian financial sector. The main impacts of this bankruptcy were: the remittances of Jordanian 
working abroad decreased sharply because they lost their confidence on the Jordanian dinar (Central bank of 
Jordan data). In general, the depositors lost their deposits, the employees lost their jobs and the investors lost 
their confidence in the Jordanian market. After the investigation by the Jordanian State Security Court, the court 
found that the CEO of the bank (who was the founder and the chairman also) was, besides using the bank’s 
resources for his own interests, participating with some top managers in fraud and misstatements. Following the 
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scandal of Al-Batra Bank, other three Jordanian Banks faced some serious financial situations during the period 
of 2000-2002 namely; Jordan-Gulf Bank Philadelphia Investment Bank and Amman Investment Bank. The 
three mentioned banks faced some financial problems due to unwarranted loans and the corruption of the top 
management. 
 
In the comparative business market, top management is more responsible to the society. They are required to 
consider CSR in their decisions making in order to gain social and economic benefits (Andayani & Atmini, 
2012). Therefore, the present role of accounting is to meet the needs of the social such as deliver information to 
the interested parties in order to evaluate economic and financial activities. Managers should consider the 
interest of all owners, shareholders and other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, consumers and whole 
the society. Nik-Ahmad (1999) considered CSRD as important as the disclosure of financial information in 
decision making. 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an optimal tool to improve the financial firm performance (Pava & 
Krausz, 1991; Preston & O’Bannon 1997; Taha & Haziwan, 2013), sales growth and returns (Ruf et al., 2001) 
firm’s reputation (Freeman, 1984), employee satisfaction, and customer satisfaction (Andayani & Atmini 2012). 
Another important purpose of CSR is to improve the brand image which will result in increasing sales and 
improving customer’s loyalty (Taha, 2013). Furthermore, good workplace is one of the firm’s responsibilities 
towards the employees. Having good workplace will improve the quality and productivity (Taha, 2013) and 
attract skilled employees (Gardiner et al., 2003). 
 
Currently, there is a demand for companies to go beyond financial accountability to shareholders and integrate 
interests of all stakeholders. In short, CSR reporting arises from the idea of accountability, which is an important 
concept in corporate governance. Hence, the pressure on firms to report CSR activities has been increased (Day 
& Woodward, 2009). CSR reporting involves voluntary disclosure of corporate’s actions concerning social and 
environmental issues (Ellerup Nielsen & Thomsen, 2007). Therefore, the role of a corporate report is to inform 
society of the extent of actions taken by the firm in fulfilling their responsibilities (Deegan, 2004).  
 
The concept of CSR has been defined by authors and institution as well, World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) defines CSR as “the continuing commitment by a business to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families as well as of the local community and society at large”. Similarly, European Commission goes in the 
same line of (WBCSD)’s definition. It is stated that CSR is “A concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis”. Additionally, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales pointed out that 
“Corporate responsibility is about ensuring that organizations manage their businesses to make a positive impact 
on society and the environment whilst maximizing value for their shareholders”. The above definitions offered 
by international organizations, it is clear that CSR focuses on the activities and policies of a corporation 
regarding matters of environmental impacts, social involvement, human rights, and products.  
 
This study has contributed to the current literatures in several ways; besides examining the level of CSRD in a 
developing country, it provides an evidence of CSRD in a banking sector. Financial sectors in general, and more 
specifically banks, have been widely ignored in previous literatures due to their stringent regulatory system 
(Barako & Brown, 2008). In addition, this study extents other studies by deeper investigating the board of 
directors. Previous studies have indicated that investment orientation and reward system in the investment 
institutions may affect the attitudes of institution directors. However, we provide an evidence of the institutional 
directors’ status in extending the reporting of CSR. Moreover, it is argued that the institutional directors are 
qualified and experts, therefore, it is expected that institutional directors do add value to the investee firms. 
 
Next sections of this paper are organized as following; section two represents the literature review including 
theoretical perspective and hypothesis development. Third section represents the design of the research 
including sample, data collection, measurement of the variables and research methods. The empirical results are 
discussed in the section four. Finally, conclusion, contribution, implementation and future work is presented in 
the fifth section. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1. Legitimacy theory 
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The basic notion of the legitimacy theory is a “social contract” between the firm and the social that it operates in 
and are required to perform various desirable socially actions (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Legitimacy theory has 
been widely used to explain CSRD motivations (e.g. Guthrie & Parker, 1989; O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 
2002). Legitimacy theory suggests that large firm disclose more information related to the social and 
environment due to accountability and visibility reasons (Cormier & Gordon, 2001).Therefore, the annual 
reports of the large firms provide information related to CSR more efficiently (Cowen, Ferreri &Parker, 1987). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) concluded that management discloses more information in order to reduce the 
perceived legitimacy gap between management and shareholders resulting in improving CSRD. 
 
2.2. Recourse dependency theory 
 
Firms are viewed in resource dependency theory as depending on their external environment. Based on this 
theory, organizational effectiveness is resulted from the ability of the firm to manage its internal resources, and 
more importantly, its ability to secure the vital external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Non-executive 
directors are believed to be more monitoring mechanism (Grace et al., 1995). Institution with a significant 
ownership has the right to appoint one or more directors, based on their ownership, to represent them in the 
bank’s board (Jordanian Companies Law, Article 136, 2006). Thus, blockholders, via their representative 
directors, will have the power to affect corporate decisions (Boyd, 1994). Therefore, independent directors are 
expected to play more roles in protecting the minorities’ rights and link the firm to their external environment. 
Outside directors have a vital network to confer the firms with necessary strategic resources and information 
(Ruigrok et al., 2007). 
  
2.3. Institutional director and CSRD 
 
The importance of institutional directors has emerged from the significant of institutional ownership and from 
the significant roles they play in the boardrooms. Previous studies have highlighted the institutional directors as 
effective mechanism to monitor the management (Coffee, 1991) and improving the corporate governance 
system (Brickley et al., 1988). More importantly, institutional directors are considered as strategic directors (Oh 
et al., 2011) leading to engage in CSR activities (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Previous studies related to ownership 
structure have indicated that the ownership and voting power are associated (Brickley et al., 1988; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Generally, institutional investors own a significant percentage of shares (Pound, 1992; Oh et al., 
2011). As a result, institutional investors have more information than other shareholders and important voting 
power in the board (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997). 
 
Institutional investors can be categorized as mutual funds, investment banks, insurance companies and pension 
funds. Therefore, those institution investors may have representative(s) in their investee firms based on their 
shareholdings. Thus, those directors are assumed to add values to the investee firms’ boards. Previous studies 
indicated that the investment orientation is different from type to type. For instance, mutual funds, insurance 
companies and investment banks consider the financial performance as a main objective (Starks, 1987) unlike 
the public pension funds. Accordingly, institutional directors will be affected by compensation systems of their 
firms and their firms’ investment orientation. In addition, the compensation system will affect the orientation 
investment because some institution ties the compensation to the performance. As a result, the institutional 
directors will adopt short-orientation investment to meet the rewards system (Starks, 1987). Correspondingly, 
institutional directors representing the public pension funds are often salaried and their institutions are long-term 
oriented (Starks, 1987). 
 
In the public pension funds, they may take all the stakeholders in their consideration in the board meetings. 
Institutional directors, more specifically, who represent public pension funds enhance corporate social 
performance and corporate accountability (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991). Further, public pension funds are found 
to be long-term oriented (Starks, 1987) and willing to hold shares in an investee firm up to a decade (Hill & 
Snell's, 1988). By contrast, mutual funds, investment banks and insurance companies tend to be short-oriented 
investors. In addition, their representative directors are rewarded based on the investee firm’s financial 
performance (Starks, 1987). Therefore, Schwab and Thomas (1998) stated that pension funds are the most 
significant institutional investors to align the interests between the contracting parties. 
 
On the other hand, institutional owners may pressure their representative directors to enhance the financial 
performance in the short-term. Therefore, they may not be willing to spend their time or their firm’s resources in 
such social activities (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Likewise, previous studies found that institutional managers 
consider corporate growth strategies rather than developing R&D strategies (Hoskisson et al., 1996; Kochhar & 
David, 1996). Indubitably, R&D strategies are long-term investment, and some institutional directors consider 
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short-term investment in order to meet the reward system. On the other words, investment managers prefer to 
spend their time and their fund’s recourses in a way that improves their short financial performance rather than 
developing the firm image or reputation. Further, Johnson and Greening (1999) reported that institutional 
managers are not interested to spend their time or invest their resources in developing community, woman and 
minorities and employee relations (the human resource dimension of CSR). Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are developed: 
H1: there is a significant relationship between institutional directors and CSRD. 
 
Previous studies related to ownership structure have indicated that the ownership and voting power are 
associated (Brickley et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, the non-independent non-executive 
institutional directors seem to have more voting power than their independent counterparts. Significant 
institution ownership results in difficulties of selling the shares without affecting the share price (Pound, 1992; 
Oh et al., 2011). This indicates that institutional investors are supposed to invest in long-term activities 
including CSR. In addition, independent institutional directors are expected to be good safeguarded due to their 
independence roles. Legal independent directors are assumed to play the roles of individual independent 
directors. Therefore, the following H1a and H1b are developed:  
 
H1a: there is a significant relationship between independent institutional directors and CSRD. 
H1b: there is a significant relationship between non-independent non-executive institutional directors and CSRD. 
 
Agency theory suggests that the ownership and management should be separated in order to have effective 
monitoring in the board. If the CEO is representing other parties, it seems that he/she is an affiliated manager 
who is following the strategic of his/her investing institutions. Unarguably, the board has the power to appoint 
or remove the CEO. It can be assumed that board of director, consisting of a majority one institution, based on 
their institution’s significance ownership, tend to appoint a CEO from their own institution. Therefore:   
 
H1c: there is a negative significant relationship between CEO institutional director and CSRD. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
A ten years data set consisting of 16 banks is used in this study. However, 13 annual reports are missing 
resulting in reducing the sample to 147 banks/years. Banking sector is chosen in this study because it is the 
largest sector in Jordan in terms of capitalization. Interestingly, 14 banks (out of 16) are categorized under the 
top 20 firms in Jordan. Further, annual reports of the top market capitalization firms reveal that those firms are 
more interested and concerned of being benchmarked for corporate governance best practice (Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003; Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Yau et al., 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010). This means that the top market 
capitalization firms use their annual reports as an indicator of good corporate governance.  
 
3.2. Data Collection 
 
Data related to CSR activities is gathered from both annual reports and CSR reports (sustainability reports and 
GRI reports). Additionally, the data related to the institutional directors is collected from annual reports 
(directors’ profiles). However, some banks disclose information related to the legal directors (institutions) rather 
than the representative directors. In these cases, information regarding the representative directors is gathered 
from Amman Exchange Market (AEM) using two reports namely; the appointment and resignation reports and 
board of directors and ownership reports. Lastly, data related to the control variables is collected from the 
annual reports of the banks. 
 
3.3. Measurement of the Variables 
3.3.1. Measurement CSRD  
 
Content analysis is used to check the information about CSR activities made by the Jordanian banks with the list 
of items in the CSRD index. Disclosed item scores 1 and otherwise 0. Then, the CSRD is calculated to each 
bank by calculating the ratio of actual score whereas maximum score that a bank can get is 100 and the 
minimum is 0. Further, similar to other studies (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke 2005; and Ghazali, 2007), the 
unweighted method is used in this study to score the CSR. On the other words, all items are equally valued. This 
means that all the items have the same value regardless of their relevance or importance of specific user groups 
(Cooke, 1989; and Chau and Gray, 2002). Besides, no any penalty has been imposed for undisclosed items 
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(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and all the dimensions are equally valued. The unweighted method used in disclosure 
index helps in reducing the subjectivity in evaluating the weights of the items (Barako & Brown, 2008).  The 
CSR index is computed as follows: 
nj
Xij
CSRindex
nj
t

 1        Where;
 
CSR index is CSR reporting index; nj is number of items expected for jth 
firm; Xij equals 1 if the item disclosed and 0 otherwise. So that    0 <= ij<= 1 
 
3.3.2. Measurement of Independent Variable 
 
Table 3.1. Measurement of institutional director 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Institutional director Directors who representing an institution. Percentage of institutional directors to the board size. 
Independent institutional 
director 
Directors who represent an institution with 
ownership less than 5%.  
Percentage of Independent institutional director to 
institutional director. 
Non-independent non-
executive institutional director 
Directors who represent an institution with 
ownership more than 5%. 
Percentage of non-independent non-executive 
institutional director to institutional director. 
Institutional CEO CEO who is representing an institution 
(institutional-affiliated CEO). 
Dummy variable, 1 if the CEO is representing an 
institution and 0 otherwise. 
Board size Size of the board of director. Number of the directors setting in the board. 
Banks age The age of the selected bank since its 
establishment. 
The number of years since the bank was established. 
Leverage  Long-term debt divided by the total assets. The percentage of the bank’s long debts by the total 
assets. 
Profitability Return on assets. Earnings before tax divided by total assets. 
 
3.4. Research Models 
 
The following regression models are utilized to determine the influence of institutional director on CSRD:  
 
CSRD= β0+ β1INSD+ β2BSIZE+ β3 BAGE + β4 LEV + β5 ROA + ε……… (1) 
CSRD= β0+ β1INSDIND+ β2INSDNINE+ β3BSIZE+ β4 BAGE + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + ε……… (2) 
CSRD= β0+ β1CEO-INSD+ β2BSIZE+ β3 BAGE + β4 LEV + β5 ROA + ε ……… (3) 
 
Where; CSRD is Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, INSD is institutional director, BSIZE is the board 
size, INSDIND is independent institutional director, INSDNINE is non-independent non-executive institutional 
director, CEO-INSD is a CEO who representing an institution, BAGE is Bank Age, LEV is Leverage, and ε is 
Error Term.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
It can be seen from Table.4.1 that the in average Jordanian banks disclose 46% of our checklists’ items. The 
highest disclosure level is 83% while the lowest is 21%. This result indicates that even some banks have moved 
toward a social responsible business in the last decade, some other banks are still not taking into consideration 
the social responsible activities. The low level of CSRD may mean either a low level of CSR activities or a lack 
of CSR reporting experience, or it might be because of the cost of reporting. This level of disclosure is similar to 
the level of CSRD in some banking sector in Pakistan, 47%, (Sharif & Rashid, 2013). However, it is higher than 
Kenyan banks disclosure level, 15%, (Barako & Brown, 2008). 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 
CSRD 147 0.46 0.45 0.1099 0.21 0.83 
Institutional director 147 0.4644 42.9 0.2260 0.0 0.9167 
Independent institutional director 147 0.2253 18.2 0.2283 0.0 0.75 
Non-independent non-executive institutional director 147 0.6651 66.67 0.2917 0.0 1.5 
CEO institutional director 147 0.1088 0 0.3125 0.0 1 
Board Size 147 10.27 11 2.04 5 13 
Bank age 147 31.45 29 17.92 1 83 
Leverage 147 0.7624 84.7 0.2159 0.089 0.963 
ROA 147 0.0192 0.019 0.0095 -0.015 0.059 
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Regarding the institutional directors, 46.4% of the directors in the Jordanian banks are institutional directors. 
The majority of the institutional directors (66.5%) are non-independent non-executives, representing 
blockholders, while (22.5%) of the institutional directors are representing independent institutions. However, 
almost 11% of the institutional directors are serving as CEOs. High level of the institutional directors serving in 
the Jordanian banks’ boards could be due to the level of institutional ownership. The institutional ownership 
plays a considerable role in determining the percentage of institutional directors; that is, one institution with a 
significant ownership might have more than one director to be represented in the board of an investee bank. 
Based on the Jordanian companies’ law, the institutions have the right to appoint one director or more based on 
their percentage of ownership to represent them in the investees’ boards (Article, 135, Para.A.1, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, this study includes control variables to address the potential omitted variables that might influence 
the firms to engage more in the socially responsible activities and thus disclose them accordingly. Four control 
variables are employed in this study namely; board size, firm age, leverage and profitability. Based on the 
Jordanian corporate governance code, the board size shall not be less than five members and not more than 13 
members. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 shows that the Jordanian banks are fully complied with this 
recommendation; the maximum board size is found to be 13 directors while the minimum size is five. The mean 
board size is 10.27 members indicating that the Jordanian banks’ boards are not crowded. The average bank age 
is 31.5 years; the eldest bank was established in1931 (83 years old) while the newest bank was established in the 
end of 2011 (one year old). In addition, the mean of the leverage in the Jordanian banks is 76% with a maximum 
of 96% and a minimum 9%. The average of ROA level in the Jordanian banks is almost 2%, while the 
maximum level is around 6%, some other banks recorded losses resulting in a minus of ROA (-1.5%).  
 
4.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Pearson correlation matrix is used to examine the relationship between independent variables to each other 
(Weisberg, 2005). In the first model, as shown in Table 4.2, institutional director is positively and significantly 
correlated with board size and leverage at the level 0.001 and 0.05 respectively. Board size is also correlated to 
bank age and leverage (P < 0.001). In addition, leverage is found to be correlated to bank age and ROA (P < 
0.001). 
Table 4.2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Model (1)         
 VIF CSRD INSD Board size Bank age Leverage ROA  
CSRD  1.0000       
INSD 1.51 0.1534 1.0000      
Board size 1.85 0.2839*** 0.5610*** 1.0000     
Bank age 1.28 0.5986*** 0.0844 0.3912*** 1.0000    
Leverage 1.37 0.0828*** 0.1726** 0.3492*** 0.3049*** 1.0000   
ROA 1.17 -0.1404* 0.1060 0.0951 0. 0166 0.3619*** 1.0000  
Model (2)         
 VIF CSRD INSDIND INSDNINE Board size Bank age Leverage ROA 
CSRD  1.0000       
INSDIND  2.14 0.2298*** 1.0000      
INSDNINE 1.60 -0.0534 -0.4465*** 1.0000     
Board size 1.56 0.2839*** 0.4019*** 0.1738** 1.0000    
Bank age 1.40 0.5986*** 0.4652*** -0.1262 0.3912*** 1.0000   
Leverage 1.48 0.0828 0.3760*** 0.0611 0.3492*** 0.3049*** 1.0000  
ROA 1.17 -0.1404 0.1361* -0.0077 0.0951 0. 0166 0.3619*** 1.0000 
Model (3)         
 VIF CSRD CEO-INSD Board size Bank age Leverage ROA  
CSRD  1.0000       
CEO-INSD 1.08 -0.0228 1.0000      
Board size 1.30 0.2839*** -0.1006 1.0000     
Bank age 1.24 0.5986*** -0.0462 0.3912*** 1.0000    
Leverage 1.42 0.0828 0.1802** 0.3492*** 0.3049*** 1.0000   
ROA 1.17 -0.1404 0.1364* 0.0951 0. 0166 0.3619*** 1.0000  
Notes: (1) INSD is institutional director, INSDIND is independent institutional director, INSDNINE is non-independent non-executive 
institutional director, CEO-INSD is a CEO who representing an institution. (2) ***, ** and * present the significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively. 
 
In the alternative analysis, this paper breaks down the institutional directors into two groups, independent and 
non-independent, non-executive (model 2). Independent institutional director is found to be correlated to board 
size, board age, leverage (P < 0.001) and to ROA (P < 0.01). Further, Independent institutional director and non-
independent, non-executive institutional director are found to be negatively correlated (P < 0.01). This indicates 
that banks with institutional blockholders do not tend to appoint independent directors from independent 
institution. In the third model, the institutional-CEO (CEO-affiliated) is analysed separately and measured as a 
  
Proceedings of the International Conference on Accounting Studies (ICAS) 2015 
17-20 August 2015, Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia 
 
 293 
dummy variable equals one if the CEO is affiliated to institutional investors and zero otherwise. The results 
show positive correlations between institutional CEO and both board size (P < 0.05) and bank age (P < 0.01). 
 
Further, Pearson correlation is used to detect multicollinearity between the independent variables (Weisberg, 
2005). Multicollinearity is considered as a problem if the Pearson correlation results exceed 0.70 (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001) or if it is higher than 0.80 (Farrar & Glauber, 1967; Studenmund & Cassidy, 2001). Pearson 
correlation shows that there is no multicollinearity problem between the independent variables. As shown in 
Table 4.2, the highest correlation between independent variables is 0.561 which is found between board size and 
institutional director (first model). Based on the Table 4.2, the multicollinearity is not considered as a problem 
in this study. 
 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) is also used to test the multicollinearity in this study. Accordingly, if the VIF 
value is higher than 10, the multicollinearity is thought to be problematic (Gujarati & Porter, 2003; Hair et al., 
2006). In order to solve multicollinearity problem, one of the variable should be dropped (Hair et al., 2006). In 
this study, the VIF of the variables are well below the critical limit of VIF (10.0) they vary from 2.14 to 1. 17. 
This confirms that there is no multicollinearity problem in this study. 
 
4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Multiple regression is used to test the casual relationship between CSRD and institutional director. In the first 
model, institutional directors is measured as a percentage of institutional directors serving in the board to the 
board size. The result from multiple regression analysis shows that there is a negative but insignificant 
relationship between CSRD and institutional directors. Institutions’ types have been done in the previous 
literatures; Schwab and Thomas (1998) suggested that pension funds consider all CSR’s dimensions in order to 
improve the financial performance. In this study, 46.4% of the directors are representing institutions; therefore, 
it is worthy to go deeper in their characteristics based on their status rather than their institutions’ types. Thus, 
this study breaks down the institutional director variables into two groups; independent institutional director and 
non-independent non-executive institutional director. Results in (model 2) indicate a positive significant 
relationship between both groups; independent institutional director and non-independent non-executive 
institutional director, and CSRD. This results support the results of other studies that studies the relationship 
between board composition and CSRD (such as Ghazali, 2007 and Sharif & Rashid, 2013).  
  
Table 4.3. Multiple Regression Analysis 
CSRD Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Insd 
 
-0.031 
(-0.43) 
__ __ 
 
Insdind 
 
__ 0.198*** 
(3.89) 
__ 
 
Insdnine 
 
__ 0.179*** 
(5.05) 
__ 
 
Ceo-insd 
 
__ __ 
 
-0.047*** 
(-6.42) 
Board size 
 
0.007 
(0.85) 
0.005 
(0.82) 
0.006 
(0.79) 
Bank age 
 
0.022*** 
(7.45) 
0.022*** 
(8.64) 
0.023*** 
(7.67) 
Leverage 
 
0.164*** 
(8.69) 
0.134*** 
(5.83) 
0.179*** 
(8.39) 
ROA 
 
-0.205 
(-0.35) 
-0.531 
(-0.11) 
-0.213 
(-0.35) 
Intercept 
 
0.101*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.086*** 
(-6.48) 
-0.447*** 
(-4.93) 
R2 .5746 .6151 .5902 
Husman test 158.11*** 121.15*** 115.34*** 
Notes: INSD is institutional director, INSDIND is independent institutional director, INSDNINE is non-independent non-executive 
institutional director, CEO-INSD is a CEO who representing an institution. 
***, ** and * present the significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
In the case of institutional CEOs, the banks disclose less information related to the social and environment; they 
disclose around 45.4% compared to 46.1 to their peers as shown in Table 4.4. In general, banks with 
institutional CEOs have more institutional directors 51% compared to 46% for their peers. In addition, the bank 
tends to appoint less independent institutional directors. In average, banks with institutional CEOs have only six 
percent independent institutional directors (from to total institutional director) compared to 25% to their 
counterparts. This means that, if the institutional directors exist in a board, the board will be dominantly 
occupied by non-independent non-executive institutional directors. Therefore, the voting power will be 
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concentrated in the hands of the blockholders (or their representatives) which might affect the minorities’ rights. 
All the banks, either with institutional CEOs or not, have almost the same percentage of non-independent non-
executive institutional directors; almost 66.6% of the institutional directors are representative of blockholders. 
Moreover, banks with institutional CEOs have smaller boards, are younger in age and leveraged but have more 
profitability.  
 
Table 4.4. Comparative between institutional CEOs and Non-institutional CEO 
 CSRD board size INSD INSDIND INSDNINE Bank age Leverage ROA 
Non CEO-INSD 0.461 10.3 0.46 0.25 0.665 31.75 0.75 0.019 
CEO-INSD 0.453 9.7 0.51 0.06 0.666 29.18 0.87 0.023 
Notes: INSD is institutional director, INSDIND is independent institutional director, INSDNINE is non-independent non-executive 
institutional director, CEO-INSD is a CEO who representing an institution, Non CEO-INSD is a CEO who is not representing an institution. 
 
As seen in the table 4.4, the profitability of the banks run by institutional CEO is higher than their counterparts. 
This result indicates that institutional CEOs prefer to spend their time and their fund’s recourses in a way that 
improves their financial performance rather than developing the firm image or reputation. This finding is similar 
to Johnson and Greening (1999) who concluded that institutional owners may pressure their representative 
directors to enhance the financial performance in the short-term. Therefore, they may not be willing to spend 
their time or their firm’s resources in such social activities. 
 
The adjusted R2 of the three models are shown in the Table 4.3; in the first model, the adjusted R2 is almost 
57.5% and it increases to 61.5% in the second model. This means that there is a significant change in the 
adjusted R2. However, the adjusted R2 increases almost 1.5% in the third model. These results reveal that 
studying the institutional directors as a whole has not given a clear picture in this study. Thus, breaking down 
the institutional directors based on their status gives better explanation. Non-independent non-executive 
institutional directors and institutional CEOs play more roles in enhancing the level of CSRD unlike the 
institutional CEOs. This result is consistent with the results of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who found 
institutional investors have more information than other shareholders and important voting power in the board. 
Unarguably, the ownership structure is related to the voting power (Brickley et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Further, it is found in the previous studies that the institutions own a significant percentage of the 
investee’s shares (Pound, 1992; Oh et al., 2011). The results of this study seem to support the results and 
arguments of the previous studies.  The representatives of blockholder institutions (non-independent non-
executive institutional directors) play more significant roles than the representatives of independent institutions. 
Moreover, institutional CEO and low level of CSRD are found to be related as suggested by the agency theory. 
 
It is very important to notice that the institutional directors have occupied a considerable percentage of the 
boards’ seats. They present almost 46.4% of the total seats in the Jordanian banking sector. This frequent 
occurrence is seriously unsettling because, in several occasions, banks disclose information related to the legal 
directors (institutions) rather than their representative directors. Therefore, a lot of the important information 
related to the representative directors, such as their ownership or their status or their relationship with the bank, 
is hidden. This study finds some pitfalls by some Jordanian banks in appointing independent directors. It finds 
that some banks appoint institutions as independent directors but it is observed that the directors who represent 
those institutions are either blockholders (grey directors) or a bank’s former manager resulting in reducing both 
the board independence and bank reporting transparency. Based on the Jordanian corporate governance code of 
the banking sector, the director is considered as non-independent if he/she “has not been employed by the bank 
for the preceding three years”. These grey directors seem to appear more in the case of institutional directors. In 
this study, grey directors are considered as non-independent directors. Consequently, in many cases, the 
percentage of independent director seems to be less than the requirement of the Jordanian corporate governance 
code. It can be concluded that such directors’ appointments might have a serious implication in the presence of 
the Jordanian corporate governance code.  
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
This study examines the level of CSRD in the banking sector of Jordan. In addition, it examines the impact of 
institutional directors on the level of CSRD. The descriptive analysis shows, relatively, a low level of CSRD 
with a mean of 46%. In addition, institutional directors occupy 46.4% of the banks’ board seats. The analysis 
shows that 11% of the institutional directors are serving as CEOs, 22.5 % are independent institutional directors 
and 65.5% are non-independent non-executive directors. The results show that the institutional non-independent 
non-executive directors and institutional independent directors have a positive significant impact on the level of 
CSRD while the institutional CEOs have a significant negative impact. 
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This study contributes to the body of knowledge by different ways; firstly, it sheds some light on the CSRD in a 
developing country. Developing countries in general and Arabic countries in specific have scarcity of studies 
related to CSR.  In addition, this study provides an evidence of CSRD in a banking sector. Financial sectors in 
general, and more specifically banks, have been widely ignored in previous literatures due to their stringent 
regulatory system. In addition, this study extents other studies by deeply investigating the board of directors. 
Previous studies have indicated that investment orientation and reward system in the investment institutions may 
affect the attitudes of institution directors. However, we provide an evidence of the institutional directors’ status 
in extending the reporting of CSR. Moreover, it is argued that the institutional directors are qualified and 
experts, therefore, it is expected that institutional directors do add value to the investee firms. Theoretically, this 
study finds a support of separation of ownership and management by providing empirical evidence of the 
relationship between institutional CEO and CSRD.  
 
The main implementation of this study to the regulators is to clearly define the independent director. As some 
banks tend to appoint institutional directors as independent directors while in real they are not independent, the 
regulators are supposed to prohibit appointing institutional directors without clearly identifying their 
relationship to their bank and other banks in the Jordanian market. In addition, the banks are required to identify 
the representative directors side by side with their institutions to enhance the transparency of banks’ reporting. 
 
The challenges facing the firms can be due their focusing on the profits and low contribution to the society in 
which they operate and achieve their goals. Communities expect from the firms to be a part of the society; 
therefore, firms are required to be socially responsible in order to protect their survival and to get the acceptance 
from their societies. Further studies may extent the current study by examining the reasons of low level of 
CSRD. In addition, other studies may go beyond the traditional variable such as board size and independent 
board to study the boards more deeply. Quality and competence of board members is needed more than the 
board size and independence in the developing countries especially countries with low level of transparency. 
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